In Mid March 2022 the Brow Sing club asked me to conduct a book review and share some views around the Russian Ukrainian war that is currently ongoing. Here is a summary of what was discussed during that discussion.
Wars were supposed to be a thing of the past, but in the last few decades we have seen conflicts in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Yemen & Syria. Today, the Russian and Ukrainian forces are engaged in a deadly struggle that is a major escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian war that began in 2014. I believe that the current situation is a result of great miscalculations by Russia and the act of infringing the sovereignty of an independent nation by lethal force goes against the civilised rules based order we aspire for the world no matter what some of the legitimate reasons for the war have been offered.
This discussion was designed to deconstruct the present actions of Russia. To arrive at conclusions one had to dig deeper beyond media headlines and shrill twitter posts. Some of the books / titles that formed part of the discussions include (a) Not One Inch by ME Sarotte, Putin’s People by Catherine Belton, Strongman - Vladimir Putin by Angus Roxburgh, Who Lost Russia by Peter Conradi & various articles written about Russia & Ukraine including Russia & NATO written by John Mearsheimer in 2014 and How To Stand Up To The Kremlin by Joe Biden in 2018.
PART 1. Russia’s assumptions leading to the current Ukraine imbroglio.
At the turn of the millennium, when a young, shy, reticent and little-known Vladimir Putin became the leader Russia, he had inherited a vast state that had precipitously disintegrated, or “collapsed,” twice in the twentieth century—in 1917 and again in 1991—with disastrous consequences for its people. Putin had ambitions of reclaiming back for Russia a Global Super Power status, but the country lacked the institutional depth, dynamism, diversity & economic strength of western nations. Despite such headwinds Putin felt the time had come to seek & secure Russia’s deserved place is history.
Lets begin by understanding what led to this line of thinking.
A. Perceived decline of the Western Powers:
After Putin’s second term as President, the Russians’ view of the west & NATO took a sharp downturn, and it was believed that the West was in a state of terminal decline. Some factors that contributed to this view were:
- Financial Crisis: The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 greatly dented the perceived superiority of the West. The over-leveraged financial system collapse in the US followed the EU financial crisis of the PIIGS nations (Portugual, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain), added to the belief of the decline of the West.
- Weaker EU: EU enlargement was proving to be unwieldy. Deep divisions within EU were exploited by Russia which used direct bilateral agreements to weaken overall EU cohesion. High dependence of some European nations on Russian gas and the personal rapport with leaders of Hungary & Italy for instance heightened divisions within the EU. The Brexit vote by the UK, a Russia hawk, further weakened anti-Russian voices within EU and demonstrated structural weaknesses in the EU ripe for exploitation by Russia.
- Chinks in the international liberal rules based order led by the West: The Rising inequality in the West (BLM, Charlottesville protests in the US, Yellow Shirts in France), declining western industrial bases coupled with the emergence of the Chinese industrial might were important developments with lasting consequences. The order was further weakened by the deeply polarized political outlook in the west (gridlock in Washington) and the emergence of Donald Trump who challenged the pillars of the western order including questioning the validity of NATO, pulling out of WHO, terminating TPP and launching ill fated trade wars with China. Covid mismanagement by the west demonstrated the much vaunted western healthcare system was a shadow of the past.
- Western democracy under attack: In the US, across two consecutive elections, the losing party refused to accept the results of the elections. When Donald Trump was elected, the Democrats felt the election was stolen away from them and Russian election interference was a major issue that persisted across the duration of the Trump administration. When Donald Trump lost to Joe Biden, Trump said the election results were false and the infamous Capitol insurrection event took place. Fake news, information wars, polarised press all contributed to a clear divide in the US where neither party felt the other could be trusted. The west had always prided democracy & peaceful transition of power as a key differentiator of its political system and that was unravelling very fast much to the delight of Putin.
In Europe, Putin saw the rise of far right parties gaining momentum especially after the Arab Spring revolutions that brought millions of migrants into Europe that placed tremendous pressure on societies.
B. NATO expansion and resulting siege mentality within Russia in general and with Putin in particular (Putin felt the West would encircle Russia and prevent it from reaching its true potential as a world power):
- During the Soviet days, divided Germany was the fault line of the Cold War. At the urging of the Western powers, particularly the United States, Gorbachev agreed to the German unification and the entry of unified Germany into NATO. Gorbachev made the decision based on verbal assurances by his Western “partners” that in return NATO would never be expanded “one inch eastward” toward Russia. Today, having nearly doubled its member countries since the end of the cold war, the world’s largest military alliance sits on Russia’s western borders. With the Baltic countries in NATO, western forces are now just a few miles away from St. Petersburg. This insecurity was further heightened when Georgia & Ukraine applied for NATO membership.
- Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush negotiated with Mikhail Gorbachev on the expressed premise that the cold war was ending “with no losers, only winners.” But in 1992, during his re-election campaign against Bill Clinton, Bush suddenly declared, “We won the Cold War.” For the next eight years, in the 1990s, the Clinton administration based its Russia policy on that triumphalist premise, with disregard for how it was perceived in Russia. Russia’s financial weakness, the Rouble crisis, unstable leadership from Yeltsin and Chechen wars further weakened Russia’s hand when it came to negotiations with the West on key military matters.
- In 1999, Clinton continued eastward expansion of NATO, now directly on Russia’s borders. In the same year, despite Clinton’s assertion of NATO expansion being a non-combat policy, US-led NATO war planes bombed Serbia, Russia’s traditional Slav ally. US & NATO then swiftly recognised the breakaway province of Kosovo much to the consternation of Russia and before a formal UN vote. Russia on the other hand felt it played by the rules by refusing to unilaterally recognise breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia of Georgia despite these two provinces being pro Russia.
- In 2008, President Bush tried to fast-track Georgia and Ukraine—both former Soviet republics into NATO which became “red lines” for Moscow. Russia on the other hand had expressed a desire to join NATO but NATO felt that was an impossible ask. The Russians felt Russia in NATO would ensure world peace from Vancouver to Vladivostok. When Georgia tilted to the EU & the West, Russia & Georgia went to war that resulted in a quick sharp win for Russia.
- Colour revolutions (orange, rose & tulip) took place in erstwhile Soviet countries that bordered Russia. These revolutions were pro west, pro EU / NATO oriented mass people movements that were perceived by Russia as western attempts to destabilise Russia’s borders and ultimately export the same to Russia itself. Colour revolutions resulted in some cases of pro Russian leaders in countries like Ukraine being replaced by pro West, EU / NATO leaning leaders adding to Russia’s insecurities.
- For a more detailed view of the perceived ‘hurt & indignation’ felt by Russia, readers are urged to listen to Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Council in 2007 [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hQ58Yv6kP44]
C. The Russian resurgence story building up in Russia and in Putin’s mind.
After the dismantling of the Soviet Union, Russia went through economic & political crisis. It face one of the worst economic depression in peacetime, mass poverty and the disintegration of the highly professionalized Soviet middle classes. Since then, Russia has seen an economic resurgence primarily driven by its hydrocarbon resources. Russia is also strong in Defence exports and an emerging power in Agri and livestock exports. The Russian economy moved from a country that defaulted on its obligations to building up a sovereign & stability fund and growing one of the worlds largest FX reserves.
Whilst the economy seemed to grow and flourish and key parameters looked robust, Russia was unable to diversify its economy from hydrocarbon & minerals. Sanctions coupled with tepid western capital flows into other sectors ensured Russia’s fortunes would continue to rise and fall in line with natural resource prices.
At home, Putin flattened Grozny to settle the Chechen issue. Russia’s military interventions in Georgia and Crimea were clinical & swift. Both confrontations ended in wins for Russia. Moscow’s military success in Syria in September 2015 meant the continuation of the Assad regime. This was seen as a great success in face of what was seen as western ineptitude in Syria. Putin was seen as a decisive leader backed by a modern Russian military that could achieve results. Decisive wins in Georgia and Crimean annexation were further proof of Putin’s leadership and the effectiveness of the Russian forces that saw sustained modernisation under Putin.
Sochi Olympic Games was another statement of Russia’s arrival and together with Putin’s shirtless pictures, it cemented his image as a Russian strongman who would protect the Russian state and with that came soaring domestic approval ratings.
The key pivotal moment to cement Russia’s greatness was its relationship with China, the other dominant power to the US. China helped diversify Russian energy sales from Europe by providing a huge home market in the east. China and Russia then embarked on a no limits friendship creating a massive Eurasian power that could tilt the balance away from the US led western world.
PART 2. How it all unfolded in Ukraine
Ukraine faced deep divisions, linguistic divides, an unstable government and severe economic conditions for many years in a row. The Crimean invasion of 2014 had driven its pro-Russian population into territories controlled by the Russians.
Its current President, a former comedian was seen as a lightweight at the world stage with pro West leanings but limited understanding of what was at stake. Zelensky was viewed as one in the line of many Ukrainian presidents that had come into power only to be deposed later.
One can only speculate what drove the Russians to do what they did. Perhaps they were expecting a repeat of their lightening quick Crimean offensive that was met with tepid resistance from the Ukrainians. Limited or no western opposition was expected and the sanctions response would be weak and fractured as was the case during the Crimean annexation.
Further, support for Ukraine in terms of lethal weapons from the west would be very limited. This would mean the Ukrainian army would collapse seeing the mighty Russian force and the government of Zelensky would capitulate and flee. This could be the repeat of Afghanistan where the US hastily pulled out and the pro US government swiftly collapsed handing power back to the Taliban.
That is where the miscalculation appears to be.
- The previous Russian offensives meant that the remaining Ukrainian population was fiercely united in their opposition to the Russians. The way the Ukrainians rallied behind President Zelensky was unexpected by Russia.
- Unlike the past, the west under President Biden rallied in their support of the Ukrainian cause and subjected the Russians to the some of the most intense financial sanctions regime against a major world power. Countries like Germany which tended to be neutral in such instances in the past swiftly reversed course backing Ukraine.
- In anticipation of a quick win Russian forces seemed to have not been fully briefed and the war has stretched on longer than expected. Despite propaganda wars from both parties, independent sources do confirm Russian losses of lives and equipment. Gains for Russia are slow and indecisive.
- Where Ukrainian cities have ultimately fallen to Russian forces, there is no jubilant welcoming for the Russian forces as liberators. Instead populations have hardened in their opposition. Winning the battle might be easier for Russia than gaining the peace.
- The ability for the Russians to topple the Zelensky government in a matter of days and instal a pro Russia government does not seem as easy as it might have been perceived on the eve of the war.
Whilst an outright Russian defeat in Ukraine seems slim, if that happened it will be catastrophic to Putin and will most likely lead to instant instability inside Russia.
How and when the conflict is finally resolved is still undetermined. Whilst talks have taken place between Russia & Ukraine, they have proved indecisive. Both parties are confident in pushing ahead and the toll from the conflict rises as each day passes.
A best case scenario would be for both parties to agree to a temporary ceasefire whilst their diplomats discuss a workable solution for both sides. This gives Ukraine & Russia space to come up with a peace plan and spare civilians from the untold misery of war. However, that seems unlikely as Russia is keen to force a decisive win although that is proving harder to come by.
PART 3 Lessons for the rest of the world
A very interesting point made during the discussions was that the use of force by Russia in Ukraine represents a failure of the Russian alternative to the American Supremacy. This is underscored when you consider that NATO was expanding in their backyard with the willing support of the former Soviet partner states. No NATO nations have demonstrated a will to exit NATO and join Russia in a pact. On the other hand largely most of the erstwhile Warsaw Pact nations have switched allegiance and either joined NATO or are anxious to join NATO.
The Russian use of force is also in contrast to the Chinese approach which has been limited in their use of military force to pursue their interests in the recent past. China has used a combination of trade, financing, investments, technological knowhow to win over some countries or drive a wedge and establish neutrality. This was something that Russia sorely lacked because its own economy was tiny and had little to offer outside hydrocarbons which it routinely weaponised.
The wider lesson from this conflict should give pause to revanchist states that are contemplating the use of force to redraw geographical boundaries. Boilerplate assumptions like the west is in terminal decline and fractured may not always be the case. Governments in smaller countries may not instantaneously collapse & flee on the sight of a military conflict. In some cases battles or even wars may be won but holding the peace becomes impossible. However, as history has shown, history may not repeat itself but it can rhyme. We have seen similar contours of miscalculations in the past and nothing unfortunately suggests they wont happen in the future.
