De-Carbonising The Industrial Sector - Carbon Capture - Part D

Carbon Capture & Storage (CCS) is an integral part of the decarbonisation story but this strategy has not been well understood or publicised till date. CCS has also been grossly underfunded in the past decade as compared to solar or wind power generation or electric vehicles. Per some estimates, solar power has attracted annual investments of around US$ 80 -120 billion or more per annum in the last decade - CCS on the other hand has been struggling to secure capital (<US$ 5 billion per annum). 

Understanding the big picture

Before we jump into what CCS is, what its challenges are and its applications, it would be advisable to take one step back and appreciate a fundamental concept of decarbonisation. 

To achieve decarbonisation or net zero society there are two fundamental approaches. In common nomenclature the two are expressed as (a) conservation or prevention techniques (b) sequestration or capture techniques. 

Solar or Wind generation are good examples of conservation techniques. With conservation or prevention techniques, power is generated from wind or solar assets without the emission of CO2 or GHGs. This is one critical technique towards de-carbonization. On the other hand, there are sequestration or capture techniques that attempt to capture the CO2 being emitted into the atmosphere. 

The world needs both prevention AND capture to achieve net zero. There is no path that suggests one technique can be used exclusively. Both have vital roles to play. 

Conservation techniques especially in power generation are competitive on $/ton of carbon basis largely due to the fall in solar and wind generation costs. The cost of carbon is calculated by swapping solar for coal fired generation, determining the cost of swapping coal to solar and working out how much CO2 has been saved over the life of the assets after the swap. For wind and solar, the costs to switch are negligible and at times even negative (cash accretive to swap coal to solar). 

However,  conservation costs ($/CO2) rise sharply for sectors that are hard to abate such as CO2 emissions from cement, airlines, shipping etc. The alternatives to prevent CO2 generation for these sectors is very expensive. There is where sequestration comes in. 

Sequestration has three buckets. (A) Natural sinks - forests are prime examples. Plants and trees use CO2 from the atmosphere as part of photosynthesis and emit oxygen (B) CCS which we shall evaluate in more detail (C) DAC or direct air capture. Similar to CCS but unlike CCS which is associated with a particular emitter of CO2 (e.g. coal fired plant), DAC is about capturing CO2 from the air directly. 

Sequestration as a technique may not be competitive where coal fired generation can be swapped for solar. However, as we move into reducing CO2 emissions from industry (e.g. cement) or harder to abate sectors like airlines, sequestration could be more competitive than conservation. 

Summary

To understand the full picture around decarbonisation always consider both conservation (reduces or eliminates CO2 emissions) and sequestration (captures CO2 emitted). These two approaches have different applications across the CO2 emitting world and are best used as complimentary techniques rather than competing ones.  

The graph below gives you a very good sense how the two techniques interplay. Also note the tighter range of cost uncertainty around conservation techniques as compared to sequestration. 

CCS - Carbon Capture (Step 1)

The first step in CCS is capturing carbon. Capturing CO2 from industrial plants and power stations has been ongoing and is not a brand new technique. The challenge this decade is to expand and scale up its applications across the world beyond natural gas processing plants and power generation. 

Two principal methods to capture CO2 are (a) physical separation (b) chemical absorption. There are other techniques as well which are evolving like the use of membranes. 

Chemical absorption uses solvents. Solvents absorb the CO2 from the flue gas (CO2 emitting stream) column. The solvent is then heated at high temperature in another column to release the CO2 and the solvent can then be re-used. A relatively mature technique, has been used in power plants in the US, steel projects, waste to energy facilities. Physical absorption is based on absorption or adsorption. Adsorption takes place via a solid like activated carbon. Absorption on the other hand takes place via a liquid surface like solvents. After the CO2 has been captured, it is released separately via heat, pressure or vacuum. Physical separation has been used in natural gas processing plants, ethanol, methanol production facilities and is mostly used in the US. 

The appropriate technique used to capture CO2 depends on:

- Initial CO2 concentration: the higher the CO2 concentration, the easier to capture and more cost effective

- Final desired CO2 emission levels: as the target capture rates are higher naturally the cost increases 

- Temperature and pressure requirements and availability 

- Cost considerations : one of the key cost consideration is CO2 concentration levels. If the CO2 levels are high to begin with then it becomes economical and cost effective of a $ per CO2 captured basis. Thats why CCS has mostly been used in natural gas processing plants as of now where CO2 concentration is very high. It also explains why direct air capture (DAC) of CO2 from the air is so expensive as CO2 concentration in the air is very low. The graph below shows the cost of CO2 capture as depicted by IEA. 

That is why CCS is actively used in gas processing plants or ethanol production. Look at the $/ton cost to capture CO2 directly from the air in comparison.  

- flow rates of flue gas that contains the CO2 and finally 

- integration of the CCS with the source of emissions 

CCS - CO2 transport (Step 2)

Transport is the next step after capturing CO2. The captured CO2 needs to be transported to a safe and secure location for long term storage. Without transport CCS fails. The prime mode of transporting CO2 is pipelines although ships, trains and trucks can also be considered. As of now the cheapest mode remains pipelines especially when final storage location is onshore. North America where CCS is most common, benefits from the extensive pipeline network that exists for transporting CO2. 

Transport costs can be around 25% of the total cost. The cost depends a lot on how much CO2 is to be transported, the distance, size of the pipelines, pressure & moisture content requirements. The cheapest of course is to repurpose existing oil & gas pipelines subject to HSE parameters. If the final storage location is an offshore structure then transport cost goes much higher. Offshore adds considerable complexities to CCS operations and ships might have to be used in place of pipelines if distances are too great. 

The U in CCS? (Step 3)

Sometimes CCS is referred to as CCUS. The U stands for utilisation, i.e. utilisation of CO2 that has been captured and transported. Around 230-250 million tons of CO2 is used by industry today (world emits around 35 billion tons of CO2 per annum). The two primary applications of CO2 are (i) manufacture of Urea where CO2 is used as a feedstock (ii) Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) 

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enhanced_oil_recovery#:~:text=Enhanced%20oil%20recovery%20(abbreviated%20EOR,using%20primary%20and%20secondary%20recovery.]  

where CO2 is injected into existing oil & gas production sites to enhance the recovery of hydrocarbons. 

The other potential applications for CO2 in the future could include synthetic fuels like methanol, production of chemicals and use of CO2 in building materials. All these are relatively untried and untested and it would be hard to provide an estimate on the usage potential for CO2 in these applications. 

Use of CO2 is a vital factor from a cost perspective. If the captured CO2 finds a use then the cost of CCS drops. However, usage of CO2 needs to be carefully considered. Otherwise it may result in captured CO2 being returned back to the atmosphere thus defeating the purpose of CCS. To this effect EOR and the building materials sector are attractive as CO2 remains captured for a very long time. Use of CO2 as a synthetic fuel much less so as the captured CO2 gets released back upon combustion of the synthetic fuel. 

CCS - Storage - (Step 3)

After CO2 is captured and transported comes the final stage which is CO2 must be stored securely to prevent CO2 being released back into the atmosphere. We did discuss some uses of CO2 earlier. If there is a use for the captured CO2 then its great but if not it must be stored. 

Storage involves injecting the CO2 into deep underground formations that meet the stated requirements of a porous rock where the CO2 can be housed and a impermeable layer of rock which provides the seal to prevent the CO2 from escaping. The two most preferred formations are (i) saline formations - porous rock with saline water acting as a seal and (ii) depleted oil & gas reservoirs as they previously have stored hydrocarbons in a porous rock with an impermeable rock layer on top. Gas reservoirs (low CO2 reservoirs) are especially preferred.  As EOR is now fairly common, storing CO2 in depleted fields is well established and proven. 

Storage sites are not expected to be the constraint for CCS. As per the IEA, storage capacity as of today ranges between 8,000 giga tons to 55,000 giga tons. Geographically North America, Russia and Africa have the highest storage potential. Onshore storage will be preferred to offshore as the costs to transport and store is much lower. To set the storage capacity in perspective, the IEA estimates the lowest bound of storage capacity is 8,000 giga tons whereas the total cumulative CO2 capture via CCS from 2020 to 2070 is 220 giga tons under IEA's decarbonisation / net zero scenario.

Risk of leakage of CO2 has been playing on the minds of many CCS skpetics. However, there is a long history of injecting and storing CO2 safely and securely. 

From a cost perspective, the cost of storing CO2 is much lower than capturing or transporting CO2. Cost of storage is based on methods of injections, location of the site and storage characteristics. If CO2 is being used for EOR purposes then costs can be offset via higher production of hydrocarbons. Onshore storage in the US could be below $10/ton of CO2 stored for nearly 60% of the sites. 

CCS Challenges

CCS has faced underinvestment in the past decade. CCS projects received very little funding hence the technology remained sub scale as compared to solar or wind power generation. A section of environmentalists have attacked CCS since it does not prevent the use of hydrocarbons but focusses on capturing CO2 hence does not encourage a pivot away from hydrocarbons. As CO2 gets used as EOR projects, the complaint is using CO2 for EOR results in more hydrocarbon recovery thus the solution is facilitating more hydrocarbon usage. 

Capturing CO2, i.e. step 1 is the hardest and costliest. CO2 capture needs energy which adds to costs and CO2 being emitted in the process. Transporting CO2 is not easy and may require new pipelines or re-tooling existing ones.

Despite these challenges, CCS is expected to become front and centre of decarbonisation strategies this coming decade. In part E we shall look at the trends and changes to CCS that are expected to impact it this coming decade.  

The Pivot - By Kurt Campbell - Part C

I now come the final two principles of US policy in Asia as elucidated by Kurt Campbell in his book "The Pivot". I did mention this in Part A of the note that having this 8 point framework is extremely useful as it provides great clarity on understanding America's actions or the lack thereof in the Asian region. So I would thank Kurt once again for distilling these points for us. 

Understaffed & under resourced 

Kurt is unapologetic when he argues that America's engagement with Asia has been episodic which also means resources and staffing has been inadequate. Due to constant surges and retreats towards Asia, the State Department has not been able to develop a large and strong contingent of professionals that understand and appreciate Asia. This has meant that when trouble has arisen in Asia, the US' initial response has been weak and ineffective. 

Numerous examples of this phenomenon have been citied including America's misread of Imperial Japan and following Pearl Harbour a string of defeats ensued for the US. It was only many months into the war that America finally got its act together and was able to defeat Japan. Yet post the war, America could not sustain the peace in Asia. The same outcome transpired in Korea where a short staffed, under equipped America both politically and militarily lost the initial face off with North Korea. That resulted in a surge by America to recover lost ground but the surge was not sustained and America disengaged once again from the region after the ceasefire. The Korean peninsula has remained partitioned till today and is considered one of the global flash points. 

Who lost China? This had far reaching consequences for American diplomacy & the State Department. 

As we saw in the earlier note, after cessation of WW2 hostilities, civil war in China resumed and the communists finally prevailed over the KMT. America's support for the KMT was extremely limited which turned the tide in favour of the communists. Same was the case with South Korea where America's initial support and attention was limited. Further compounding the issue was the Alger Hiss conviction where a US State Department diplomat was found to be a communist spy and was convicted for his activities.  

This gave rise to Senator Joseph McCarthy (JC) and his witch hunt. JC argued that China and Korea were lost because the US State Department had communist spies and sympathisers. Despite showing little or no evidence, JC was able to breathe fire down the US State Department. As a result, a number of professionals were purged that weakened the State Department considerably. 

This had long term impacts when it came to professionals capable of understanding Asia leading to America misreading the situation in Asia more than once. 

This phenomenon has continued. Kurt argues that even today, the number of State Department professionals who have European or Middle Eastern expertise is far greater than those who boast of Asian expertise. This will have far reaching consequences, for an effective pivot by America towards Asia requires a large bench of seasoned professionals & diplomats who have mastered the vast nuances & challenges of Asia. 

Spread & Encouragement of Democracy 

Many countries in Asia have established democratic forms of government due to the backing, assistance, encouragement and even at times a hard push by the US. 

Whilst the Philippines laboured under US rule for a number of years, upon securing independence the country embraced democracy. Democracy was suspended under Marcos but since his departure democratic roots have firmly taken place in the Philippines.

Japan's democracy is a case of direct intervention by America. After Japan's defeat in WW2, the new constitution of Japan was written by America and that required implementation of democratic, liberal values in Japan and curtailment of the role of the Emperor. Japan today is a vibrant and matured democracy and the Emperor is reduced to a symbolic head. 

South Korean democracy came much later than Japan's. Under the strong support of the US, the South Koreans first enhanced and industrialised their economy. However, by the 80s there was a strong push for democracy in South Korea and the US pushed the country to adopt this form of governance. Since then South Korea like Japan is a vibrant democracy. 

Taiwan is not too dissimilar from South Korea. After the KMT decamped to Taiwan post the defeat in the civil war, Taiwan developed economically but politically was not a democracy. Eventually under US encouragement & promotion, democracy took roots in Taiwan as well. Today Taiwan is an engaged democracy and stands as a clear proof that Chinese people and civilisation can be compatible with democratic ideals; something the CCP argues against. 

Looking at the experience of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, Indonesia too embraced multi party democracy after bouts with the military and dictatorship.

On the other hand, the US has had issues when either democracy has been jeopardised or prevented from flourishing. China of course is the prime example on this issue and the US has been repeatedly arguing and hoping for democracy to flourish on the mainland. The US also sanctioned Burma for its failure to adopt democracy and likewise Fiji was admonished after a military coup. 

There have been times especially during the cold war when the US adopted a more pragmatic approach preferring to ally with single party ruling countries or dictatorships in Asia as long as they were opposed to communism. However, in general the US has been a strong supporter for democratic values and rules based institutions in Asia for a long while. 

The Pivot by Kurt Campbell - 8 Lessons - Part B

We now come to the next two lessons as enumerated by Kurt Campbell is his book "The Pivot".

Conflict, Military Engagement and Power Projection 

This is one aspect of US' engagement with Asia that many are familiar with but it would be good to lay out some of the key events in this note. Once again Kurt Campbell has done a superb job in bringing these issues out in Chapter 3 of his book "The Pivot" 

The US has been involved in four armed conflicts in Asia. 

1898 & The Philippine War of Independence - 1898 was the year the US defeated the Spanish and gained the territory of Philippines. President McKinley at the time was not even sure where Philippines was on the map. It was something that fell into the US' lap after they defeated the Spanish. The US wanted to civilise, educate and Christianise (recall one of the key pillars from Part A) the locals, however that message did not go down well with the locals. 

War ensured. US despatched troops to the region, suffered casualties (way lesser than the locals) and ultimately held onto the Philippines as a colonial outpost like their European counterparts. Philippines stood in contrast to the US policy of eschewing territorial ambition and favouring trade. There was considerable internal debate in the US when it came to Philippines as a number of prominent Americans disagreed with the Imperialist strategy of the US. However, the Philippines became independent only after WW2 and remained a US colony for years. 

1898 was a key year for the US. It gained access to the Philippines, annexed Hawaii and gained Guam. With these three territories in the bag for the US, the US was able to secure mutually self reinforcing bases from which it could finally project power into the Pacific and beyond. 

Japan & The Road To War - with Theodore Roosevelt now at the helm from 1901, American flexing of power via these naval bases accelerated. The US dispatched troops to mainland China to quell the boxer rebellion and protect its interests on the mainland.

But the greatest friction the US would face would be Japan (note many scholars now look to the issues with Japan as a learning slate for the upcoming issues with China). After Commodore Perry opened Japan up to trade in 1854 (via Naval force), Japan accelearted its development and industrialisation. By the turn of the century Japan was a force to reckon with. In 1905 Japan defeated the Russian navy at the Tsushima Straits and stunned the western world (an Asian country defeated a Western Power). Now Japan was seeking more respect & room to grow and manoeuvre in its 'sphere of influence'. 

Whilst Woodrow Wilson failed in Europe with the League of Nations, Asia was a different story. A number of treaties were signed with the Pacific Powers like Japan & the UK in the 1920s culminating in the Washington System.  These were both diplomatic and military treaties including the infamous 5:5:3 ratio between US, UK and Japan respectively in regard to their naval size and power. With these treaties the US continued to press for the sovereignty of China, prevent colonisation of the mainland and focus on trade and peaceful relations in the Pacific.  

But Japan chafed at this 5:5:3 treaty and whilst it held for a number of years it eventually gave way to Japanese expansion. By the 30s Japan had occupied Manchuria and rejected the naval ratios. An arms race was on its way. But the US was still hesitant in taking severe action against the Japanese. Powers at home favoured a hands off approach. That gave the Japanese further confidence and with that they bombed Shanghai and by 1937 launched a full scale war in China. [Many Asian and Sino observers attribute the start of WW2 not in 1939 but in 1937 itself with the Japanese declaration of war and invasion of China. When I visited a museum in Hong Kong, the tour guide was explicit that whilst world war 2 began in 1939 in Europe, HK, China and Asia were already at war by 1937.] 

The US finally responded. In all too familiar fashion, the US applied sanctions and embargoes on Japan with the aim of starving Japan's military complex. This further hardened the Japanese and public opinion in Japan was inflamed. Yet even now the US was still distracted by events in Europe and did not fully devote its energies to the emerging situation in the Pacific to its detriment. 

A last ditch diplomatic effort between the US and Japan to resolve the situation failed in 1941. Japan felt it was cornered and the only option left was to strike out. That Japan did and the day Dec 7, 1941 "lives in infamy". Pearl Harbour rocked the US, the choice was clear and all out war between Japan and US commenced. The war finally ended in 1945 with the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the unconditional surrender by the Japanese. This was the US' most intensive military engagement in Asia spanning multiple years and multiple countries. 

1950 and the Korean War - The Korean war began shortly after the end of WW2. Dean Acheson gave a speech that defined America's sphere of influence and umbrella of protection and failed to mention South Korea. That was enough for Kim Il-sung, North Korea's Communist leader, to seek the approval of Stalin & Mao to commence the invasion of democratic South Korea. 

In June 1950, Kim's forces crossed the 38 parallel and the Southern forces were over whelmed. The US rallied the UN and Douglas MacArthur made the daring landing at Incheon pushing the Northern forces back to the 38 parallel. MacArthur then convinced Truman to pursue the Northern forces beyond the 38 parallel which was a risky proposition. With Truman's tightly circumscribed approval, the US forces (in contravention of what was agreed with the President) reached all the way to the Yalu River (border of China and North Korea). China & Mao were then drawn into the struggle formally. China committed more than a million troops and the US forces were pushed back to the 38 parallel. [The Korean war museum in Seoul is an excellent place to visit. The museum provides great insights into the war and one can spend a day or two there.]

By 1951, the war was a stalemate. Parties were unwilling to push their forces any further and the situation remains frozen till date. Over 35,000 Americans died in this war and this war was the first war which ended in statement for America in Asia. For US leadership this was a point of intense deliberation and the US resolved never get embroiled in Asia which would lead to the loss of American lives yet the outcome would be a stalemate. 

Vietnam 1961 - The spectre of stalemate loomed significantly in US decision making policy. On the other hand the US also had to take steps to prevent the spread of communism "the domino theory was gaining ground in the US". First China fell to communism, then came the deadlock in Korea with half the country controlled by the communists. 

The next to fall was Indochina. By 1954 the French felt the heat in Indochina and ultimately exited the country ending their Imperial ambitions. Like Korea, the country was divided into a communist North and a democratic South. Like Korea, the North commenced hostilities agains the South with an aim to unify the country under a communist banner. For the US it was a tough call but they decided on limited intervention to prevent the fall of the South.

Limited intervention morphed into full blown intervention. Unlike Korea, Vietnam ended in defeat for the US and more than 60,000 Americans died over a 7 year span. This was a stunning blow to the US which had not experienced defeat before. Vietnam remains a sore point till date in the US. In future conflicts, the outcome and approach of the US in Vietnam was a recurring feature. From the fear of stalemate in Korea to defeat in Vietnam meant rapid adjustments in US policy and decision making.  

The US has also been involved in a more limited fashion across all the three Taiwan Straits issues which flare up from time to time between the PRC and Taiwan. 

Note: Whilst Afghanistan is geographically situated in Asia, it would not fit in the classical definition of Asia for the purposes of this book and hence Kurt has not discussed the Afghan war. 

Episodic Engagement With Asia

The US has failed to have a deep and consistent engagement with Asia. For certain presidents like Theodore Roosevelt, Asia occupied a prime position but that was not the case for all. America's engagement with Asia has risen and then ebbed away leaving a lot of gaps that have created issues of their own. 

Prior to Pearl Harbour the US's response to Japanese aggression was fleeting. The US was not willing to impose sanctions early on and preferred a hands off approach. Contrast that with Europe where FDR was already engaging with the bases for destroyers, lend lease and Atlantic convoy operations well before formal commencement of war with Germany. Not surprisingly the US misread the situation, Pearl Harbour attacks took place and the few months after Pearl Harbour were disastrous for the US. 

Despite a comprehensive win over Imperial Japan, the US was unable to cement long lasting peace in Asia. The US was more focussed on post war European reconstruction efforts, establishment of NATO, the Marshall plan and bringing the western European allies under a common umbrella. 

Who lost China? This is a constant question that plagues America. Post cessation of the war, America was distracted by rebuilding efforts in Europe. With the war in the Pacific won, America de-esclated its forward presence in Asia and China unravelled. America which had ensured Chinese sovereignty for a long time became a passive watcher as the Chinese Civil War escalated. With Japan out of the way, the Communists and the KMT were locked in a death struggle. It is said even Mao was astonished by the lack of US support for the KMT & Chiang Kai-shek. The Communist ultimately prevailed, the KMT decamped to Taiwan and the situation remains the same till date. 

Quoting Eisenhower "the loss of China [was] the greatest diplomatic defeat in this nation's history". 

The loss of China to communism continues to plague America and American policy makers till date. It remains a classic case of "what if instead..."

Losing the peace - The losses did not stop at China. With a fleeting engagement policy and Dean Acheson's message excluding Korea (or ambiguity around Korea) led to the next conflict, The Korean war. Kim Il-sung was emboldened by Dean Acheson's message to exclude Korea from the defence perimeter and his statement of "no person can guarantee these areas against military attack". Plus the US's reluctance with troop deployment in China to support the KMT meant the road to invade South Korea was open. That led to war and ended in a stalemate. Like China, the situation in Korea continues till today. 

Korean war meant a surge for America in Asia but upon cessation of hostilites meant retreat once again. 

The Vietnam war meant another surge once again for America. Given the disastrous outcome of the Vietnam war for the US meant the US further disengaged with Asia. One of the more natural outcomes was the Nixon doctrine where he encouraged Asian nations to take on more responsibility for their own security and push back against communism instead of relying on the US. This is in stark contrast to the US in Europe where the US continued to amplify its support and commitment to combat communism. 

With the detente in place with China by the 70s, the US felt confident to further reduce its gaze on Asia and focus entirely on Europe and combat the Soviet Union. The Soviet threat and mainland Europe was the US preoccupation for a considerable period of time. 

The ending of the cold war in 1991 did not mean the US would refocus its efforts on Asia. The first Gulf war and events in Yugoslavia kept the US preoccupied in other theatres with a consequent continued neglect of Asia. 

Tthe third Taiwan Straits crisis occurring during the Clinton administration and the rise of a nuclear belligerent North Korea should have prompted the US to double down on Asia but it did not. Events of September 11 meant the US would engage in deadly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The never ending wars and preoccupation in the Middle East meant a demotion of Asia in the mindspace of America. 

Vacuum does not last long - With the US's focus on other geographies, Asia withered from the agenda. But a vacuum does not last long. This cleared the road for the rise of China. China used this space to develop economically, militarily and politically. It forged trade and ties with countries around the region and used this space to grow and project its own power. 

Today the situation has called for a swift and focussed re-engagement on the part of America. The "Pivot" is supposed to achieve just that. But has too much ground been ceded? Do countries in Asia feel that the US might get distracted once again? Could the US' gaze shift back to Europe with a revanchist Russia? Would there be bi-partisan support for the Pivot to Asia given the Washington grid-lock? 

What about China? Will it make room for the US' re-engagement? Can countries in Asia navigate the trilemma of trade v/s investment v/s military security arrangements? With the US led liberal rules based order survive or will Asia be engulfed in another dispute that could see the emergence of another system?

Many questions that will be answered in this decade!  

The Pivot by Kurt M. Campbell - 8 Lessons - Part A (First Four)

Instead of reviewing Kurt Cambell's entire book Pivot (The Future Of American Statecraft in Asia), I have selected the most important and interesting chapter in his book to share his thoughts on eight defining and influential themes that have underscored America's engagement with Asia. 

Kurt Cambell served as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the Department of State from 2009 to 2013 in the Obama administration. The pivot to Asia was the seminal foreign policy move of the Obama administration which continues till today. The 21 century is clearly the Pacific century and America's engagement with Asia remains the vital piece of architecture for the most important region in the world. 

Whilst the book has many chapters devoted to the Pivot to Asia, Chapter 3 was the most enlightening one for me. Kurt has laid out in an absolutely brilliant manner, the eight themes that underpin America's engagement with Asia. For any watcher of this great game that is unfolding in Asia, understanding and appreciating these eight points are fundamental. I am grateful that Kurt has been able to distill these vital points in a clear and succinct manner and is a testament to his vast experience and knowledge of Asia and diplomacy. 

I will share these eight principles in the order in which they appear in Kurt's book. Without a doubt reading these eight principles gave me an excellent understanding of how America has shaped and will shape its engagement with Asia. These principles are excellent because they provide the bookends to understand America's actions in Asia. What's notable is whilst each principal in isolation might have ebbed and flowed in terms of importance over the past decades, there has been a high degree of consistency across various administrations when it has come to these eight defining features. 

Here are the first four. I hope you enjoy reading these four as much as I did reading them and then distilling them in this note. 

Tyranny of Distance 

For long the US has prided on being a two ocean power namely an Atlantic and Pacific power. However, the depth of its engagement across these two water bodies has been remarkably different. Whist the Atlantic separates the eastern seaboard of the US and continental Europe, the two landmasses are bound by personal, cultural and historic ties. It also helps that geographically Europe is much closer to the US than Asia. Asia is infact twice as far as Europe and even with the comforts of modern travel, the distance between the US and Asia is vast resulting in reduced interactions. The US has attempted to bridge this gap through forward bases like Hawaii & Guam and diplomatic relations with Fiji & Samoa (all landmasses dotting the Pacific ocean), yet the distance remains vast. 

The one US president that made a concerted and powerful effort to bridge the gap and project power and diplomacy across the Pacific was Theodore Roosevelt. In a coordinated attempt he ensured a civilian and military delegation to cross the Pacific in a fleet of ships that made calls at Hawaii, Japan, Philippines, China & Korea over a span of two months. This marked a high point in the US' interest in Asia. It is unlikely that such a large outreach will occur again. Tyranny of distance will remain an inalienable phenomenon of the US' engagement with Asia.  

This gives rise to the second critical issue. 

Stereotypes, Mockery and Underestimation 

Whether its mainstream media, movies, informal conversations or people in positions of high power; there has been a continued stereotyping of Asian people, their abilities, character and threat perceptions. On one hand there has been the "lure of the orient" where Americans have been captivated by Asia as the land of indulgence, elegance and grace. The myth of Asia being exotic, luxurious - a world of its own. This is in stark contrast to Americans perceptions of Europe, which are more grounded in reality, and where there has always been a greater understanding and affinity between the two peoples. 

Perceptions did not stop just at the exotic, but percolated into a thought process that resulted in Asians being branded as weak, fragile and incompetent. That resulted in Americans being caught off guard with Pearl Harbour, but also later again in Korea and Vietnam. The over riding theme being the confidence and capabilities of the American soldiers versus the lack of the same when it came to an Asian army man. That led to many a humbling defeat in wars and battles in the Pacific and Asian mainland and in many cases overwhelming force and swift rearguard action had to take place to stem initial losses. 

Incredibly the perception of Asians on the American mainland has been around threat and menace. From Chinese labourers being the cause of depressed wages in the 1850s, to bans on Chinese immigration to the internment of Japanese origin but American citizens during WW2. Whilst 120,000 odd Japanese origin American citizens were rounded up being perceived as a threat to the war effort, more than 10 million German American citizens did not face the same issues. Kurt quotes Time & Life Publisher Henry Luce "Americans had to learn to hate the Germans, but hating Japs comes natural". Post war attitudes changed towards the Japanese but they resurfaced in the 80s as Japan rose as an economic super power with a perceived threat to challenge American economic dominance. 

Stereotypical casting of Asians and Asian societies still remains in America and can play a vital role in how Americans and America perceives Asia.   

Trade - Cornerstone of American interest in Asia 

Trade with Asia has been explored right from the founding days of America. The Empress of China left NYC as early as 1784 to commence trade with China. [http://www.wiu.edu/cas/history/wihr/pdfs/wihr-empress-of-china.pdf] and returned back after 15 long months. Whilst America was keen to trade, Asia was reluctant to reciprocate trade outreaches with America and the Europeans; preferring to remain insular and keeping the 'barbarians' away.

In 1833 America was able to persuade the Kingdom of Thailand to commence trading starting a critical process for Asia but made little headway in China, the prime target. Unlike America, Britain though had little patience. As Britain's trade deficit ballooned with China, Britain attempted to offset it with opium imports into China which was fiercely resisted by the Chinese. By the mid 1800s, trade gave way to conflict and China faced the first of the opium wars (1st Opium war ended 1842). With heavy defeats, China opened up to trade, signing what are now known as the the unequal treaties (also commencing the century of humiliation). This meant that China had to open up its ports to foreign powers, notably Britain. 

America preferred trade to war with the Chinese and Treaty of Wanghia (1844) gave the US equal treatment on par with the British when it came to Chinese trade. [https://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860/china-1]. With this treaty, trade grew and with that America's interest to protect its trade flow with China. The US pushed to ensure China's sovereignty with a view to ensure continued trade flows between the US and China and prevent European colonisation of China. The flag was following the trade here although America's principal focus being on trade rather than acquisition of Chinese territory. 

But trade followed the flag in the case of Japan in 1854. The exploits of Commodore Perry & the US Navy's show of force in Tokyo bay culminated in the treaty of Kanagawa resulting in the opening up of Japan to trade. Yet another Asian country was now open to trade with America and the Europeans. Japan's trajectory was in stark contrast to the Chinese who continued to remain insular and unaware of the changes surrounding them. [https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/treaty-of-kanagawa-signed-with-japan]

1899 was a pivotal year with the establishment of the Open Door Notes (modern day precursor to the WTO). The US got the other major powers of the day - UK, France, Russia, Germany and Japan to agree to free & open trading, equal trade status for all powers and to eschew territorial ambitions in China. The US wanted via Open Door to promote free trade, lower tariffs and avoid territorial footprint in China. The US wanted equality of treatment when it came to trade & China and likewise further open China to free trade and commerce. Ironically this is also the time the US was implementing immigration bans on the Chinese into America [https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/hay-and-china]. The was America's alternative proposition to "European Colonialism". 

When war broke out between Russia and Japan, America even became a peace broker and put an end to hostilities in the Western Pacific. The chief aim of America again being preserving trade in the region, something a conflict between two major powers (Russia and Japan) would heavily disrupt. For this, Theodore Roosevelt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906. 

The US continued to ensure that trade was prioritised over all other factors in Asia. Trade with Asia was hugely beneficial to the US and the US with diplomatic and military might continued to ensure this would be the case. This was America's policy even as WW1 broke out in Europe. 

Post WW1, there was no change in America's policy towards Asia. However, as America's might grew so did its ability to establish the American order in Asia which prioritised trade. 

The early 1920s saw a series of trade, geopolitical and military agreements being signed known as the "Washington System". The US got all the major European powers & Japan to execute what is known as the Nine Power Treaty (US, Japan, Russia, Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Portugal). This treaty ensured and reaffirmed the sovereignty of China, equal trade opportunity for all the nine countries and promote trade over imperial conquest. What I did observe is that whilst trade with China and Asia was central to this treaty there was no Chinese presence or involvement! 

Unlike Europe, the US was able to secure a treaty in Asia and keep the peace for a few years. Till of course WW2, by which time the entire continent of Asia was engulfed in total & absolute war ending with the unconditional surrender of Japan in 1945. 

Post WW2, the US was integral to the efforts to reconstruct Japan from the ashes. Japan grew spectacularly in the years after WW2 eschewing military ambition for trade, commerce, and technology whilst the US provided the security umbrella. Japan's model became a template for South Korea, HK, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand to follow. A model that focusses on trade, goods, manufacturing, open access, competitive wages, lower trade barriers and minimal military conflict. 

Trade therefore has been emblematic of America's engagement with Asia right from the commencement of the Republic. Whilst America has periodically been dragged into many conflicts in Asia, it has consistently promoted trade in the region. Trade, therefore, becomes critical to any US policy and ambition in the Asia Pacific region.  

Religion and Christianity 

American missionaries saw the vast and untapped potential of Asia's large and burgeoning population as an extraordinary opportunity to spread their faith. With faith having a strong anchor back home in the US, American missionaries set out very early on to spread the faith to Asia. In this regard faith and trade moved alongside although it may be argued that they were not inter-dependent. 

Kurt contrasts the attitudes of America and Britain in this regard and emphasises that America pushed heavily on the spread of the faith unlike Britain. The British East India Company for instance never put faith on top of its agenda when it came to Asia. From Kurt's perspective spread of education was fundamental to the missionaries and an anathema to the East India Company. 

With strict controls on the interactions between Chinese and foreigners in place, it was the missionaries who early on devised creative means to engage with the locals and were the first to learn the Chinese language - through craft and ingenuity. 

The missionaries failed in their efforts to en-masse convert the million of Asians but their impact is felt across countries especially in the field of education and health. 

Kurt highlights the work of two prominent missionaries. (a) John Scudder Sr and his family. The family's work was focussed on India and the Christian Medical College and Hospital at Vellore, India is an example of the work. (b) John Leighton Stuart in China - his work around Yenching University in China and establishing close links between Yenching, Harvard and Princeton. Yenching was closed by Mao but Peking and Tsinghua university have adopted many of Yenching's departments. 

Kurt also highlights the closeness of the missionaries with the US government. John Leighton Stuart became US ambassador to China. John Paton Davies & John Service, both missionaries led the first efforts to engage with Mao and Communist Party. 

The Methodist and Catholic churches continue to focus their efforts on Asia. As religion declines in Europe, the church sees Asia as a 'pivotal' market to further its faith. 

Asia's relationship with the church and missionaries will continue to remain frosty or viewed with suspicion. On the other hand, whilst the American state does not formally and actively propagate religion, missionary activity and their protection will not be entirely abdicated.