The Pivot by Kurt Campbell - 8 Lessons - Part B

We now come to the next two lessons as enumerated by Kurt Campbell is his book "The Pivot".

Conflict, Military Engagement and Power Projection 

This is one aspect of US' engagement with Asia that many are familiar with but it would be good to lay out some of the key events in this note. Once again Kurt Campbell has done a superb job in bringing these issues out in Chapter 3 of his book "The Pivot" 

The US has been involved in four armed conflicts in Asia. 

1898 & The Philippine War of Independence - 1898 was the year the US defeated the Spanish and gained the territory of Philippines. President McKinley at the time was not even sure where Philippines was on the map. It was something that fell into the US' lap after they defeated the Spanish. The US wanted to civilise, educate and Christianise (recall one of the key pillars from Part A) the locals, however that message did not go down well with the locals. 

War ensured. US despatched troops to the region, suffered casualties (way lesser than the locals) and ultimately held onto the Philippines as a colonial outpost like their European counterparts. Philippines stood in contrast to the US policy of eschewing territorial ambition and favouring trade. There was considerable internal debate in the US when it came to Philippines as a number of prominent Americans disagreed with the Imperialist strategy of the US. However, the Philippines became independent only after WW2 and remained a US colony for years. 

1898 was a key year for the US. It gained access to the Philippines, annexed Hawaii and gained Guam. With these three territories in the bag for the US, the US was able to secure mutually self reinforcing bases from which it could finally project power into the Pacific and beyond. 

Japan & The Road To War - with Theodore Roosevelt now at the helm from 1901, American flexing of power via these naval bases accelerated. The US dispatched troops to mainland China to quell the boxer rebellion and protect its interests on the mainland.

But the greatest friction the US would face would be Japan (note many scholars now look to the issues with Japan as a learning slate for the upcoming issues with China). After Commodore Perry opened Japan up to trade in 1854 (via Naval force), Japan accelearted its development and industrialisation. By the turn of the century Japan was a force to reckon with. In 1905 Japan defeated the Russian navy at the Tsushima Straits and stunned the western world (an Asian country defeated a Western Power). Now Japan was seeking more respect & room to grow and manoeuvre in its 'sphere of influence'. 

Whilst Woodrow Wilson failed in Europe with the League of Nations, Asia was a different story. A number of treaties were signed with the Pacific Powers like Japan & the UK in the 1920s culminating in the Washington System.  These were both diplomatic and military treaties including the infamous 5:5:3 ratio between US, UK and Japan respectively in regard to their naval size and power. With these treaties the US continued to press for the sovereignty of China, prevent colonisation of the mainland and focus on trade and peaceful relations in the Pacific.  

But Japan chafed at this 5:5:3 treaty and whilst it held for a number of years it eventually gave way to Japanese expansion. By the 30s Japan had occupied Manchuria and rejected the naval ratios. An arms race was on its way. But the US was still hesitant in taking severe action against the Japanese. Powers at home favoured a hands off approach. That gave the Japanese further confidence and with that they bombed Shanghai and by 1937 launched a full scale war in China. [Many Asian and Sino observers attribute the start of WW2 not in 1939 but in 1937 itself with the Japanese declaration of war and invasion of China. When I visited a museum in Hong Kong, the tour guide was explicit that whilst world war 2 began in 1939 in Europe, HK, China and Asia were already at war by 1937.] 

The US finally responded. In all too familiar fashion, the US applied sanctions and embargoes on Japan with the aim of starving Japan's military complex. This further hardened the Japanese and public opinion in Japan was inflamed. Yet even now the US was still distracted by events in Europe and did not fully devote its energies to the emerging situation in the Pacific to its detriment. 

A last ditch diplomatic effort between the US and Japan to resolve the situation failed in 1941. Japan felt it was cornered and the only option left was to strike out. That Japan did and the day Dec 7, 1941 "lives in infamy". Pearl Harbour rocked the US, the choice was clear and all out war between Japan and US commenced. The war finally ended in 1945 with the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the unconditional surrender by the Japanese. This was the US' most intensive military engagement in Asia spanning multiple years and multiple countries. 

1950 and the Korean War - The Korean war began shortly after the end of WW2. Dean Acheson gave a speech that defined America's sphere of influence and umbrella of protection and failed to mention South Korea. That was enough for Kim Il-sung, North Korea's Communist leader, to seek the approval of Stalin & Mao to commence the invasion of democratic South Korea. 

In June 1950, Kim's forces crossed the 38 parallel and the Southern forces were over whelmed. The US rallied the UN and Douglas MacArthur made the daring landing at Incheon pushing the Northern forces back to the 38 parallel. MacArthur then convinced Truman to pursue the Northern forces beyond the 38 parallel which was a risky proposition. With Truman's tightly circumscribed approval, the US forces (in contravention of what was agreed with the President) reached all the way to the Yalu River (border of China and North Korea). China & Mao were then drawn into the struggle formally. China committed more than a million troops and the US forces were pushed back to the 38 parallel. [The Korean war museum in Seoul is an excellent place to visit. The museum provides great insights into the war and one can spend a day or two there.]

By 1951, the war was a stalemate. Parties were unwilling to push their forces any further and the situation remains frozen till date. Over 35,000 Americans died in this war and this war was the first war which ended in statement for America in Asia. For US leadership this was a point of intense deliberation and the US resolved never get embroiled in Asia which would lead to the loss of American lives yet the outcome would be a stalemate. 

Vietnam 1961 - The spectre of stalemate loomed significantly in US decision making policy. On the other hand the US also had to take steps to prevent the spread of communism "the domino theory was gaining ground in the US". First China fell to communism, then came the deadlock in Korea with half the country controlled by the communists. 

The next to fall was Indochina. By 1954 the French felt the heat in Indochina and ultimately exited the country ending their Imperial ambitions. Like Korea, the country was divided into a communist North and a democratic South. Like Korea, the North commenced hostilities agains the South with an aim to unify the country under a communist banner. For the US it was a tough call but they decided on limited intervention to prevent the fall of the South.

Limited intervention morphed into full blown intervention. Unlike Korea, Vietnam ended in defeat for the US and more than 60,000 Americans died over a 7 year span. This was a stunning blow to the US which had not experienced defeat before. Vietnam remains a sore point till date in the US. In future conflicts, the outcome and approach of the US in Vietnam was a recurring feature. From the fear of stalemate in Korea to defeat in Vietnam meant rapid adjustments in US policy and decision making.  

The US has also been involved in a more limited fashion across all the three Taiwan Straits issues which flare up from time to time between the PRC and Taiwan. 

Note: Whilst Afghanistan is geographically situated in Asia, it would not fit in the classical definition of Asia for the purposes of this book and hence Kurt has not discussed the Afghan war. 

Episodic Engagement With Asia

The US has failed to have a deep and consistent engagement with Asia. For certain presidents like Theodore Roosevelt, Asia occupied a prime position but that was not the case for all. America's engagement with Asia has risen and then ebbed away leaving a lot of gaps that have created issues of their own. 

Prior to Pearl Harbour the US's response to Japanese aggression was fleeting. The US was not willing to impose sanctions early on and preferred a hands off approach. Contrast that with Europe where FDR was already engaging with the bases for destroyers, lend lease and Atlantic convoy operations well before formal commencement of war with Germany. Not surprisingly the US misread the situation, Pearl Harbour attacks took place and the few months after Pearl Harbour were disastrous for the US. 

Despite a comprehensive win over Imperial Japan, the US was unable to cement long lasting peace in Asia. The US was more focussed on post war European reconstruction efforts, establishment of NATO, the Marshall plan and bringing the western European allies under a common umbrella. 

Who lost China? This is a constant question that plagues America. Post cessation of the war, America was distracted by rebuilding efforts in Europe. With the war in the Pacific won, America de-esclated its forward presence in Asia and China unravelled. America which had ensured Chinese sovereignty for a long time became a passive watcher as the Chinese Civil War escalated. With Japan out of the way, the Communists and the KMT were locked in a death struggle. It is said even Mao was astonished by the lack of US support for the KMT & Chiang Kai-shek. The Communist ultimately prevailed, the KMT decamped to Taiwan and the situation remains the same till date. 

Quoting Eisenhower "the loss of China [was] the greatest diplomatic defeat in this nation's history". 

The loss of China to communism continues to plague America and American policy makers till date. It remains a classic case of "what if instead..."

Losing the peace - The losses did not stop at China. With a fleeting engagement policy and Dean Acheson's message excluding Korea (or ambiguity around Korea) led to the next conflict, The Korean war. Kim Il-sung was emboldened by Dean Acheson's message to exclude Korea from the defence perimeter and his statement of "no person can guarantee these areas against military attack". Plus the US's reluctance with troop deployment in China to support the KMT meant the road to invade South Korea was open. That led to war and ended in a stalemate. Like China, the situation in Korea continues till today. 

Korean war meant a surge for America in Asia but upon cessation of hostilites meant retreat once again. 

The Vietnam war meant another surge once again for America. Given the disastrous outcome of the Vietnam war for the US meant the US further disengaged with Asia. One of the more natural outcomes was the Nixon doctrine where he encouraged Asian nations to take on more responsibility for their own security and push back against communism instead of relying on the US. This is in stark contrast to the US in Europe where the US continued to amplify its support and commitment to combat communism. 

With the detente in place with China by the 70s, the US felt confident to further reduce its gaze on Asia and focus entirely on Europe and combat the Soviet Union. The Soviet threat and mainland Europe was the US preoccupation for a considerable period of time. 

The ending of the cold war in 1991 did not mean the US would refocus its efforts on Asia. The first Gulf war and events in Yugoslavia kept the US preoccupied in other theatres with a consequent continued neglect of Asia. 

Tthe third Taiwan Straits crisis occurring during the Clinton administration and the rise of a nuclear belligerent North Korea should have prompted the US to double down on Asia but it did not. Events of September 11 meant the US would engage in deadly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The never ending wars and preoccupation in the Middle East meant a demotion of Asia in the mindspace of America. 

Vacuum does not last long - With the US's focus on other geographies, Asia withered from the agenda. But a vacuum does not last long. This cleared the road for the rise of China. China used this space to develop economically, militarily and politically. It forged trade and ties with countries around the region and used this space to grow and project its own power. 

Today the situation has called for a swift and focussed re-engagement on the part of America. The "Pivot" is supposed to achieve just that. But has too much ground been ceded? Do countries in Asia feel that the US might get distracted once again? Could the US' gaze shift back to Europe with a revanchist Russia? Would there be bi-partisan support for the Pivot to Asia given the Washington grid-lock? 

What about China? Will it make room for the US' re-engagement? Can countries in Asia navigate the trilemma of trade v/s investment v/s military security arrangements? With the US led liberal rules based order survive or will Asia be engulfed in another dispute that could see the emergence of another system?

Many questions that will be answered in this decade!